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The EU and Russia are mutually dependent on one 
another in the energy sector. More than 40% of  all gas 
and 30% of  all oil imports into the EU stems from 
Russia; some of  the member states are completely or 
almost completely dependent on energy imports from 
there. Russian Gazprom, in turn, exports mainly to 
Europe: While 30% of  the gas produced by Gazprom 
is being exported to the EU and Turkey, these exports 
make up about 60% of  the company’s revenues. These 
quotas can be reduced by means of  diversification, but 
only to a small extent and after huge financial invest-
ments. Against this background, neither the EU nor 
Russia can afford not to cooperate with the other side. 
Both would be well advised to act accordingly, espe-
cially with regard to the following examples.
Common Document instead of Energy Charter 
Treaty and Russian Counter Proposal
President Dmitri Medvedev during his visit in Helsinki 
on 20 April 2009 announced a Russian initiative for a 
‘New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation’. The 
aim of  the Russian proposal is to replace the Energy 
Charter Treaty that Russia, although it signed the treaty 
in 1994, has never ratified. In Russia, the opinion 
prevails that the Energy Charter Treaty discriminates 
against Russia, and that Russia, therefore, will never 
ratify it. Especially the transit regulations are perceived 
as directed against Russian national interests, since the 
treaty would grant third countries access to the Rus-
sian pipeline system. Gazprom and Transneft do not 
want to give up control over their pipeline monopolies 
for gas and oil and admit other companies to access 
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their networks – not Russian companies and even less 
foreign companies. The fact that the signatory states to 
the Energy Charter Treaty constantly insist on Russia 
to ratify the treaty – for instance the EU during the 
negotiations about a new Partnership Agreement – has 
increasingly made Russian decision makers believe that 
the regulations of  the treaty were detrimental to Russia. 
While Russian representatives have continued to take 
part in negotiations on amendments of  the Energy 
Charter Treaty, the Russian proposal of  a new treaty 
reveals how futile these negotiations have actually been.
However, as unlikely as it is that Russia will ever join 
the Energy Charter Treaty, it is also unlikely that the 
EU and other proponents of  the Energy Charter Trea-
ty could accept the Russian counter proposal that was 
set up without their contribution. They have fought so 
long for the treaty that this would now look like caving 
in to the Russian position. This is especially true for 
those governments promoting an EU foreign energy 
policy with a critical stance towards Russia. Single 
states like Germany might be ready to accept the Rus-
sian proposal as a negotiating basis. But for some other 
member states and for the EU as a whole the Russian 
proposal will stay a Russian proposal – and embark-
ing on it would mean a confession of  failure for their 
own project, the Energy Charter Treaty. Therefore, 
the Russian proposal is not acceptable as a negotiating 
basis for the EU. While the Energy Charter Treaty has 
passed away over the years, the Russian proposal will 
never come to life.
It is less important whether a ratification of  the En-
ergy Charter Treaty would actually disadvantage Russia; 
nor is it a key issue whether and to what extent Russia 
might be bound to the treaty already by its signature. 
The positions, too, do not seem to be irreconcilable 
since the Russian proposal postulates principles similar 
to those of  the Energy Charter Treaty and also aims 
at tackling the pending transit issue. For both the EU 
and Russia it is rather a question of  how to avoid an 
imminent stand-off  in a way that allows both sides 
to save face. An appropriate solution would be that 
both parties return to the starting line. They should 
– starting from the beginning with joint negotiations 
– work out a new document that is acceptable for both 
the EU and Russia and that both parties then pres-
ent jointly to the public, for instance as part of  a new 
Partnership Agreement. This would not only help all 
those involved to save face but would also provide for 
the long-lasting acceptance of  the new document by 
both parties.
No Modernisation of the Ukrainian Pipeline 
System without a Russian Contribution
The badly needed modernisation of  the decades-old 
Ukrainian gas pipeline system represents another 
example for the fact that initiatives that do not involve 
all parties from the very beginning remain without 
perspectives. It suggests itself  to get all of  those who 
have an interest in the smooth functioning of  the 
Ukrainian pipeline system on board for the expansive 
financing of  the modernisation – Russia as supplier, 
the EU and its member countries as customers. But 
the issue is not that simple. Russia/Gazprom is heav-
ily dependent on Ukraine since about 80% of  its gas 
exports cross Ukrainian territory and has, therefore, 
tried to reduce the Ukrainian transit power. Besides the 
construction of  bypassing pipelines like NordStream 
and SouthStream, Russia has also striven for influence 
on the Ukrainian pipeline system. In Ukraine, however, 
politicians seek to remain national control over the 
gas pipelines – just as Russia does with regard to the 
Energy Charter Treaty. No influence shall be granted 
to Russian Gazprom because the control over the 
pipelines that are so important for Russia’s gas exports 
to the EU is the only trump card that Ukraine can play 
in conflicts with Russia.
As a result, Ukraine has looked for other investors 
– especially after the last gas crisis – and created inter-
est with the EU Commission, the European Invest-
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ment Bank, the EBRD, and the World Bank. A Russian 
delegation, headed by Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, 
attended a donor conference on 23 March 2009 in 
Brussels where 2.5 billion Euros were announced as 
support for the modernisation of  the pipeline system. 
The Russian delegation, however, has not been in-
volved on equal footing in the negotiations about and 
the drafting of  the closing communiqué. Accordingly, 
the Russian reaction was huffy – the delegation left the 
conference ahead of  schedule, and the government 
postponed a meeting with their Ukrainian counterparts, 
where Russia was supposed to grant Ukraine a 5 billion 
US-Dollar loan. Were these the results that the EU was 
aiming for? Probably not, because during the follow-
ing days European politicians like Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, representatives of  leading European energy 
companies as well as even the Ukrainian leadership 
argued for Russian participation and contribution.
The involved will have to finally accept that the 
modernisation of  the Ukrainian pipeline system 
only makes sense when Russia is included. Firstly, 
the Ukrainian system cannot be separated from the 
Russian one since due to their common historical 
origins they have been built as a single system. Sec-
ondly, the gas trade which as a matter of  fact involves 
three parties – the EU as customer, Ukraine as transit 
country, and Russia as supplier – simply functions 
more securely when those three parties work together, 
especially with regard to such an important issue as 
the modernisation of  the pipeline system. More im-
portant than the content of  the agreement is that all 
the involved share their commitment in a compromise. 
Otherwise, the agreement might not be worth the 
paper that it is written on. And thirdly, it is high time 
that the EU, Ukraine and Russia stop perpetuating the 
spiral of  mutually reinforcing threat perceptions. After 
all, the exclusion of  one of  the parties raises mistrust 
and results in the excluded party to feel threatened by 
the actions of  the others. On the contrary, the in-
volvement of  all parties can build up confidence and 
disrupt this cycle. The conclusion, therefore, has to be 
once again: Back to square one. It is essential to reach 
a new agreement on the modernisation of  the Ukrai-
nian pipeline system by actively involving all parties 
from the very beginning.
More Joint Projects –  
Especially in the ‘Green Sector’
A mutual development of  the energy relations between 
the EU and Russia can only be accomplished when 
projects that concern both sides are being jointly de-
veloped and managed from the very beginning. There-
fore, it is important to identify potential new projects 
and to expand those that already exist. The need to 
realise Russia’s (as well as Ukraine’s) immense poten-
tials in the sectors of  energy saving, energy efficiency 
and renewable energies is decisive for the EU’s security 
of  supply, for Russia’s economy to prosper, as well as 
for combating climate change – and far off  ‘pipeline 
hysterics’ of  any kind. Especially German and Euro-
pean technology and know-how are able to support 
Russia’s endeavours in the ‘green sector’. These topics 
have already been dealt with for a couple of  years in a 
working group of  the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, but 
show great potential for expansion. The benefits for 
both sides are obvious: Not only can CO2 emissions 
be lowered massively by reducing domestic consump-
tion and wastage in Russia, but it is also possible to 
set free enormous capacities of  gas and put them to 
other, better uses. Russia/Gazprom can sell these 
capacities of  gas to customers in the EU at far higher 
profit margins than on the subsidised Russian market. 
European consumers, in turn, are interested in import-
ing more gas in the mid to long term perspective. As 
a result, gas trading will also lose much of  its political 
ballast and will again be increasingly regarded from an 
economic perspective.
The signs for cooperation in the ‘green sector’ bode 
well: The Russian government – most notably Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin – announced on 23 April 
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2009 plans to develop a Russian ‘climate doctrine’. He 
also explicitly called upon NGOs to participate in the 
discussion and showed, thus, a heretofore unknown 
openness for the ‘green sector’. It is, however, hoped 
that this announcement will not remain lip service 
since the doctrine was afterwards developed without 
public consultation and promotes adaptation to rather 
than fight against climate change. At least, an aware-
ness of  problems inflicted by climate change that Rus-
sia will suffer from and a readiness to look for answers 
have recently gained support among the Russian lead-
ership. One example is that the Russian Energy Minis-
try and the German Energy Agency (dena) are about 
to set up a Russian-German Energy Agency (RuDEA) 
that is slated to enhance energy efficiency and to 
upgrade the use of  renewable energies in Russia. Such 
kinds of  projects that are being jointly developed and 
operated from the very beginning do not evolve with-
out frictions – but their prospects of  success are by 
far better than those of  unilateral forays. The energy 
relations between the EU and Russia definitively need 
more of  them.
Marcel Viëtor 
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